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Speaking of Stories and Law
Linda H. Edwards*
[F]orget definition, forget assumption, watch. We inhabit, we are part of, a
reality for which explanation is much too poor and small.
–Marilynne Robinson1
In a recent article about the relationship of narrative2 to law, Stephen
Paskey gives us much food for thought.3 I applaud much of the article.
Most importantly, I agree with what may be the article’s key stance—that
“stories are central to law and legal reasoning in ways that lawyers and
legal scholars have yet to fully explore.”4 As Paskey correctly points out,
“stories are not simply a tool for persuasion: they are embedded in the
structure of law itself. In a very literal sense, no one can make laws or
practice law without telling stories.”5 From its title (The Law is Made of
Stories ) to its final paragraph6 and on nearly every intervening page,7 the
article reminds us that law and narrative are inextricably linked. The
* E.L. Cord Foundation Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I am grateful to
Stephen Paskey for his serious treatment of my now-twenty-year-old exploration of narrative’s roles in traditional legal
argument. Stephen Paskey, The Law is Made of Stories: Erasing the False Dichotomy Between Stories and Legal Rules, 11
LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 51 (2014) (commenting on Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and
Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7 (1996)). With all the excellent scholarly work that has been
done on narrative in the intervening years, it is indeed an honor to be considered as still in the game. My thanks also to Linda
Berger, Dan Edwards, Joan Magat, and Terry Pollman for their extraordinarily helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1 MARILYNNE ROBINSON, WHEN I WAS A CHILD I READ BOOKS: ESSAYS 7 (2013). 
2 Some scholars have offered distinctions between “narrative” and “story.” These distinctions can be helpful for other
purposes. I hope those scholars will forgive me for here using the terms essentially as synonyms.
3 Stephen Paskey, The Law is Made of Stories: Erasing the False Dichotomy Between Stories and Legal Rules, 11 LEGAL
COMM. & RHETORIC: JAWLD 51 (2014). 
4 Id. at 54.
5 Id.
6 See id. at 82 (“Stories thus lie at the very heart of law. They are not secondary to rules, nor are they simply (or even prin-
cipally) a tool for persuasion.”).
7 For example, the article describes legal stories as “embedded in” rules, id. at 52, 78, and as having “deep roots in” or being
“grounded in” the nature of law. Id. at 79. It claims that rules themselves “demand” stories, id. at 52; “embody” stories, id. at
76, 78; and are “the product of stories,” id. at 80. The article asserts that rules “[have] the underlying structure of a stock story,”
id. at 52 (emphasis in original), and “can be satisfied only by telling a story,” id. at 52, 78. It claims that “a governing rule is a
rule about stories.” Id. at 78.
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article concludes that “the law is made of both stories and rules.”8 I couldn’t
agree more. 
On other pages, The Law is Made of Stories seems to take a different
position—not that rules are made of stories but that rules are stories.9
Stories and rules are the same thing, the article asserts, and any perceived
differences are simply illusory matters of form. The article observes that
no one else has yet staked out this bold position, and as far as I know, that
claim is true. After characterizing existing narrative scholarship as having
“stopped short” of collapsing distinctions between rules and stories,10 the
article redefines the topic’s key terms: “rules,” “stories,” “stock stories,” and
“narrative reasoning.”11 It then applies these new definitions to a set of
examples, aiming to show that any perceived dichotomy between rules
and stories is false.12
These three moves—the characterization of existing scholarship, the
instrumental redefinition of key terms, and the set of examples offered to
debunk distinctions—give me pause. What follows are some thoughts,
respectfully offered as a concurring opinion, about these moves and about
the points of disagreement between Paskey’s The Law is Made of Stories
13and my own earlier work in The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic
Imaginations in Legal Discourse.14
I. Mapping the Scholarly Terrain
The Law is Made of Stories describes three eras of narrative schol-
arship and equates each era with a particular substantive approach. The
first era, the outsider narratives of the 1980s, is characterized as “aim[ing]
to break taboos, celebrate diversity, and ‘challenge established ways of
thinking’ by telling the stories of people who had long been outside the
8 Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).
9 For example, the article states, 
Edwards recognizes that legal rules are often the product of a narrative . . . . But Edwards is also emphatic in her
assertion that “[r]ules are not narratives.” On that last point, I respectfully disagree. My thesis is that every
governing legal rule is literally a form of narrative, in which the essential elements of a story—events, characters,
and plot—have been reduced to general terms.”
Id. at 52. Paskey emphasizes that “[a] governing rule . . . is, in fact, still a narrative[,]” id. at 72 (emphasis in original), “a stock
story.” Id. at 72 (emphasis omitted).
10 Id. at 52 (“Other writers have suggested that legal rules sometimes take the form of a story, but they have stopped short of
the claims I make here.”).
11 Id. at 59–71 & 76–78.
12 Id. at 71–76. The article’s subtitle is Erasing the False Dichotomy Between Stories and Legal Rules. Id.
13 Id. 
14 Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7
(1996) [hereinafter Edwards, Convergence]. 
legal academy.”15 A second era, set primarily in the 1990s, is said to have
focused on “theoretical and practical work on the role of storytelling in
trial practice.”16 Finally, the article sees today’s Applied Legal Storytelling
(ALS) as a third era. Legal writing faculty are the primary authors of this
work, which focuses on “pedagogy and practice” and aims to produce
scholarship directly relevant to the practice of law.17 Paskey likens ALS
scholars to “explorers who vow to journey only north and east, but never
south or west.”18
Narrative scholarship to date may be vulnerable to this implicit
criticism and to some other conceptual misunderstandings because
narrative explorers are only beginning to map the terrain. Without a
conceptual frame of reference for the work of other scholars, we may be
less likely to understand and appreciate each other’s work, and we may
also mistake the theoretical home ground of the points we want to make.
The time may have come, then, for us to develop a conceptual map of the
field. What follows is a tentative first step—one offered with the
suggestion that we try it out, knowing that we can alter, supplement, and
refine it in the years to come.19 More immediately, identifying the territory
narrative scholars have so far explored may help us think more clearly
about the question of whether rules are made of stories or are themselves
stories. This working draft of a narrative map is tentative to be sure, but
even so, in the words of Meryl Streep, it’s complicated.20 
Over the years, scholars have explored narrative’s relationship with
law by examining topics of at least three types: (1) the jurisprudential role
of narrative as a universal preconstruction, underlying most forms of
human thought, including rules of law; (2) the role of narrative in public
law talk—what we say and how we reason in briefs and judicial opinions;
and (3) the role of narrative in the lawyering task of persuasion.21 Though
15 Paskey, supra note 3, at 55 (quoting Kim Lane Scheppele, Forward: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV 2073, 2073–74
(1989)). 
16 Id. at 55.
17 Id. at 56.
18 Id. at 53. This allegory of a map is reminiscent of Plato’s allegory of the cave, in which Plato compared people unschooled
in his theory of forms to prisoners in a cave, unable to turn their heads. A fire is burning behind them, but they see only the
wall of the cave. Puppeteers hold up puppets behind the prisoners, casting shadows on the cave’s wall. Seeing only the
shadows, the prisoners think that they are seeing the objects themselves. 
19 We will continue to fill in other terrain on the map, but I deal here with the three types of topics that are most relevant to
the questions addressed in The Law is Made of Stories. I admit that in this postmodern world, the idea of a conceptual map
may be inherently flawed, but the lack of even an impressionistic overview of the field can lead us into difficulty, as this article
will explain, and obscure other fertile ground for exploration. 
20 A popular cultural description of modern relationships, used as the title of the 2009 movie, It’s Complicated, starring
Meryl Streep, Steve Martin, and Alec Baldwin. IT’S COMPLICATED (Universal Pictures 2009).
21 Many of the best articles on narrative have explored more than one type of topic and have also explored the pedagogical
question of how to teach narrative in law school classrooms.
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some decades have seen more of one kind of work than another, publi-
cation dates do not correlate smoothly with these three categories. Each
decade since at least the 1970s has included scholarship of each type. The
differences are simply matters of topic, audience, and purpose. We begin
with the first type because preconstructions generally precede all
conscious reasoning processes, including reasoning in law. 
A. Type One: Jurisprudence—It’s Stories (and Other Frames) All
the Way Down.22 
At least since the publication of James Boyd White’s The Legal
Imagination23 in 1973, scholars have been exploring the idea that law is
not merely the product of mandatory authority, as the formalists would
have us believe. Nor is it merely the product of policy combined with
power, as the realists might suggest. Rather, law ultimately is the product
of commonly shared narratives and other cultural frames that form the
soil from which all legal principles grow.24 Robert Cover was another early
voice pointing out this foundational role for narrative. The 1983 publi-
cation of Nomos and Narrative25 marked a milestone in narrative thought,
when Cover famously observed, “No set of legal institutions or
prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it
meaning.”26
Other scholars in rhetoric soon joined the work on narrative’s founda-
tional role. For example, in 1987, Peter Goodrich published Legal
Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis.27 Goodrich
explored the “preconstructions, preferred meanings, [and] rhetorical and
ideological dimensions” that account for law.28 These preconstructions
include the cultural myths, metaphors, and meta-narratives that frame the
way those in power see the world. Such implicit but largely unrecognized29
frames account for enforceable legal commands.
22 “It’s turtles all the way down” is a common jest in response to the problem of infinite regression in cosmology, perhaps
originating with the mythological idea that the world rests on four elephants that are standing on a very large turtle. In
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), Justice Scalia referred to his favorite version of the myth: 
In our favored version, an Eastern guru affirms that the earth is supported on the back of a tiger. When asked
what supports the tiger, he says it stands upon an elephant; and when asked what supports the elephant he says
it is a giant turtle. When asked, finally, what supports the giant turtle, he is briefly taken aback, but quickly
replies “Ah, after that it is turtles all the way down.”
Id. at 754 n. 14.
23 JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973). White is generally considered to be the father of the law and
literature movement.
24 “Rhetoric” is probably the best umbrella term for this multifaceted understanding of law’s foundations and functions. 
25 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term —Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
26 Id. at 4.
27 PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1987).
28 Id. at 204.
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Critical theorists such as Richard Delgado30 and Mari Matsuda31
continued the exploration of narrative and power. Unlike formalists and
realists, these scholars unearthed the hidden narratives that form the
foundations of many legal principles, contrasting the narratives of power
with the narratives of oppression. By unmasking the dominant cultural
narratives that produce the law, critical theorists demonstrated that law is
built on narrative. They used outsider stories not just to break taboos or
celebrate diversity.32 Rather, they used outsider stories to reveal the
dominant narratives from which law has been formed. Inherent in the
work of critical theorists, then, was the idea that the law is made of
stories—that dominant narrative perspectives account for the legal rules
that traditional discourse purports to state as neutral and objective. 
The key difference between traditional law-talk and oppositionist
critique is that [the] controlling myths, metaphors, and meta-narratives
are kept implicit in traditional law-talk. We don’t speak of those things.
We confine the discourse to rationalist, scientific, putatively objective
language. As oppositionists and rhetoricians have pointed out, it is in the
interests of those in power to limit law to this “self-protective” view. But
to oppositionists and at least some rhetoricians, such traditional law talk
is only an attempt to justify a result chosen for other and often unstated
reasons. In a way comparable to a psychoanalyst looking for what lies
beneath an explicit behavior, oppositionists try to look deeper to ask
what is really going on.33
Moving into this century, scholars looked to cognitive science to
analyze law’s narrative preconstructions. In 2003, Steven Winter published
A Clearing in the Forest.34 Winter relied on cognitive studies, philosophy,
and literary theory to show that legal analysis is not a matter of traditional
analytic skill, using seemingly neutral forms of reasoning like rules,
29 Law “appropriates the meaning of other discourses and of social relations themselves, while specifically denying that it is
doing so.” Id.
30 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413
(1989) (“[M]indset [is] the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of
which legal and political discourse takes place. These matters are rarely focused on. They are like eyeglasses we have worn a
long time. They are nearly invisible; we use them to scan and interpret the world and only rarely examine them for them-
selves.”).  
31 E.g., Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparation, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987)
(explaining that critical theory considers law to be a process of legitimizing what might otherwise seem illegitimate). 
32 Paskey, supra note 3, at 55.
33 Linda H. Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand? Hamdi, Myth, and the Master’s Tools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 43,
48–49 (2013) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand?].
34 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001). We might consider narrative its own
form of preconstruction, or we might consider it to be a theoretical subset of metaphor, as Winter is inclined to do. But either
way, the point is that human decision-making does not begin with rule-like articulations of legal commands but rather with
preconstructions such as narratives. 
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policies, and principles, but rather of imaginative mental processes such as
narrative and its first cousin, metaphor. Like scholars before him, Winter
sees these frames as foundational to articulated principles like legal rules. 
Type-one scholarship continues unabated, including within legal
writing scholarship. Linda Berger’s work has shown narrative’s jurispru-
dential role as part of the rhetoric of law and has analyzed foundational
narratives in several areas of law.35 For example, in Studying and Teaching
Law as Rhetoric: A Place to Stand,36 Professor Berger presents the view
that rhetoric (including the role of narrative) is a useful jurisprudential
stance for both studying and teaching law. In other articles, she has
analyzed the culturally embedded narratives that influence custody
decisions37 and the metaphors that have constrained Supreme Court
decision-making in the area of corporate law.38
Some of my own work has attempted to unmask foundational
narratives. For example, Where Do the Prophets Stand? Hamdi, Myth, and
the Master’s Tools argues that law is based on largely unstated narrative
perspectives masquerading as neutral rules and principles.39 The article
uses the opinions of the Fourth Circuit and the United States Supreme
Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld40 to demonstrate the role of the myth of
redemptive violence in law creation. It agrees with critical theorists in
finding that “[d]ominant myths and other such frames have been instru-
mental in building and maintaining the master’s house and are among the
master’s most important tools. Therefore, logically, they are part of ‘law,’
just as the unseen foundation is part of a house.”41
The point of this type-one scholarship is jurisprudential; it explores
the narrative roots of human decision-making, including in law. As
scholars have pointed out, people perceive new information through a
preexisting frame, often a story,42 and then construct legal principles to
35 E.g., Linda L. Berger, The Color-Blind Constitution: Choosing a Story to Live By, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2666076; Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A
Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative, 50 WASHBURN L. J. 275 (2011).
36 Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 LEGAL WRITING 3 (2010).
37 Linda L. Berger, How Embedded knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: An Analysis of Metaphor,
Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259 (2009). This article also proposes ways
to use rhetorical analysis to construct competing narratives in custody disputes, a type-three endeavor. See B. Type Three:
Persuasion—Narrative as a Lawyering Tool (infra notes 57–75 and accompanying text). 
38 Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on
Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007); Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking?
How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ALWD 169 (2004).
39 Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand?, supra note 33.
40 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F. 3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
41 Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand?, supra note 33, at 48. See also Linda H. Edwards, The Humanities in the Law
School Curriculum: Courtship and Consummation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
42 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Layers know, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 35 (1981); Jerome Bruner,
The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 29 (1991).
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engineer the story’s ending. Narrative is foundational to all forms of tradi-
tional law talk, including rules, policies, and other seemingly objective
reasons. We build rules from shared narratives. Thus, narrative is step one
of law creation. In this kind of narrative scholarship, then, scholars have
long contended that many, perhaps most dialectical claims, including
rules, are made of stories. 
B. Type Two: Legal Discourse—How We Speak About Law 
As we have seen, type-one scholarship explores narrative as a precon-
struction—an often unacknowledged frame that determines which legal
outcomes we will embrace, at least initially. Type one is interested in our
choices rather than our discourse about those choices. For example, the
narrative perspective known as the myth of redemptive violence can be
said to prompt us to think that the Commander in Chief should win and
Hamdi should lose.43 In type one, as a matter of jurisprudence, narrative
scholars have shown that stories, not rules, are “where the real action is.”44
Once we choose a side, however, we must justify that choice, and we
should also check that choice against authority, policy, and principle. The
scholarship of type two analyzes these justifications. Here we explore the
express reasoning that judges use to explain their decisions—that is, the
way we write and speak about legal outcomes. In traditional legal analysis,
lawyers and judges most often look to rule-based reasoning, analogies,
distinctions, policies, principles, and expressly stated client stories.45
Type-two scholarship analyzes the role of narrative in legal discourse, the
language of lawyers and judges. In other words, type-two scholarship is a
form of meta-discourse.
Scholars who have written about type-two topics have largely agreed
that in legal discourse, lawyers must speak about these other forms of
reasoning without acknowledging their narrative roots. Lawyers must
speak and write as if rules are dominant and narrative is subordinate.
Thus, Michael Smith has observed that the legal system “is not founded on
narrative reasoning” but on “a commitment to the rule of law.”46 Christy
DeSanctis has found type-two narrative reasoning to be distinct from and
subordinate to other forms of reasoning thought to be more logical and
43 These three types of narrative scholarship are radial categories rather than classical categories. In application, the
distinctions among them are matters of distance and direction rather than binary characteristics. See Linda H. Edwards, The
Trouble With Categories: What Theory Can Teach Us About the Doctrine-Skills Divide, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 181 (2014).
44 Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand?, supra note 33, at 73.
45 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 9–13.
46 MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 369 (3d ed.
2013).
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legitimate.47 Traditional legal discourse sees narrative as powerful but in
need of constraint. Steve Johansen thus writes that narrative “may be too
powerful” to operate alone.48 In Convergence, I agreed.49
It is beyond dispute that in the American system of legal discourse—
the conventional rhetoric in which lawyers must write and
speak—narrative is not “the golden ticket.”50 We may like it or we may not,
but that is how it is. Lawyers use narrative in all conventional forms of
reasoning, but they do not announce that they are doing so. Type-two
scholarship, then, identifies narrative’s implicit roles in law’s conventional
discourse. It explores narrative’s unstated roles in rule formation, analogy,
disanalogy, policy, and principle.51
Some type-two topics deal only with express discourse without
exploring its unstated narrative roots. For example, when textbooks for
law students introduce the forms of legal reasoning lawyers use,52 they are
functioning as such type-two texts.53 Their purpose is to teach students to
write and speak appropriately in the relevant discourse community.
Therefore, first-year legal writing textbooks do not explore the type-one
jurisprudential role of narrative as a preconstruction. Nor do they have the
luxury of explaining all the unstated narrative influences in traditional
forms of reasoning. First-year legal writing texts are teaching new law
students the language of the law. They are not teaching the theoretical
analysis of that lexicon. Texts for upper-level courses can go deeper, but
the primary goal of even these texts is still to teach law students to speak
and write in the language of the law.54
Other type-two topics look beneath express discourse to unearth
narrative roots. These topics explore how express forms of legal reasoning
are constructed. The discussion in Convergence is primarily this kind of
47 Christy H. DeSanctis, Narrative Reasoning and Analogy: The Untold Story, 9 Legal Comm. & Rhetoric: JALWD 149, 150 (2012).
48 Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 J.
ALWD 63, 63–64 (2010) (emphasis in original). 
49 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 40, 50.
50 ROALD DAHL, CHARLIE AND THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY (1964).
51 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14; DeSanctis, supra note 47, at 149.  
52 See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN, JOAN MALMUD, AND SANDY PATRICK, A LAWYER WRITES 135–49 (2008) (rules &
analogies); LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 55–63 (4th ed. 2015) (rules, analogies, policies, principles,
customs, inferences, and narrative); LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIzATION 4–7
(6th ed. 2014) (rules, analogies, policy, and narrative); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & KRISTEN K. TISCIONE, LEGAL
REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 9–16, 117–20 (7th ed. 2013) (rules, analogies). 
53 When these same texts shift to the topic of persuasion, they are functioning as type-three texts. See B. Type Three:
Persuasion—Narrative as a Lawyering Tool (infra notes 57–75 and accompanying text). 
54 LINDA H. EDWARDS, READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 230–323 (2012) (categories,
metaphor, & narrative); SUSAN E. PROVENzANO, SARAH O. SCHRUP, CARTER G. PHILLIPS & JEFFREY T. GREEN, ADVANCED
APPELLATE ADVOCACY 249–69 (2016) (rhetoric & framing); MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES
AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING, 35–47, 197–217 (3d ed. 2013) (illustrative narratives, metaphor).  
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type-two discussion. The article recognizes the express use of narrative as
a form of reasoning in traditional legal discourse55 but also recognizes
hidden roles for narrative in the creation of rules, analogies, and policies.56
As I read it, The Law is Made of Stories is also a type-two discussion,
exploring the narrative roots of rules as lawyers and judges use them.
Whatever the points of disagreement between these two articles,
disagreements to be shortly discussed, they are, or should be, located here
on the conceptual map. 
C. Type Three: Persuasion—Narrative as a Lawyering Tool 
Scholarship at type two analyzes narrative’s role in the basic forms of
legal reasoning, that is, the express forms of reasoning judges employ to
justify their decisions. The goal is to understand and use the language of
the law. Closely related, type-three scholarship explores the ways lawyers
use narrative to persuade. Type three includes the work of scholars writing
about all stages of legal process, including both trials and appeals. Thus,
type three includes scholarship from the 1990s57 as well as current ALS
scholarship.58 When textbooks for law students make the shift into
persuasion, they are functioning as type-three texts.59
Much of this scholarship explores the ways in which lawyers craft and
present the stories of their clients.60 For instance, Bennett and Feldman’s
1981 treatise, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and
Judgment in American Culture, explored the use of trial narratives as an
essential part of litigation practice.61 Tony Amsterdam and Randy Hertz
explored the narrative art of making a closing argument to a jury.62 Brian
Foley and Ruth Anne Robbins have identified a set of plot templates for
writing a fact statement in a brief.63 Robbins has also applied the hero
archetype to writing fact statements.64 Ken Chestek has explored
competing client narratives in six cases challenging the Affordable Care
55 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 17–23.
56 Id. at 23–27.
57 Paskey, supra note 3, at 55–56.
58 Id. at 56.
59 Several excellent texts are designed specifically for the
persuasion portion of a first-year legal writing course. See,
e.g., MARY BETH BEAzLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
APPELLATE ADVOCACY (4th ed. 2014); RUTH ANNE
ROBBINS, STEVE JOHANSEN, & KEN CHESTEK, YOUR
CLIENT’S STORY (2013).
60 The express use of narrative can be derivatively relevant
to predictive analysis as well, of course, since predictive
analysis must evaluate the persuasive impact of a narrative
on a legal decision-maker. 
61 W. LANCE BENNETT AND MARTHA FELDMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE
AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981).
62 Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of
Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 55
(1992).
63 Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A
Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing
Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS
L. J. 459 (2001).
64 Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and
Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters and
Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 767 (2006).
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Act, arguing that those narratives help account for the resulting decisions
and suggesting ways in which lawyers can choose narrative strategies to
improve case outcomes.65 Chris Rideout has explored the persuasive
impact of narrative coherence, correspondence, and fidelity.66
Some type-three scholarship has explored both ethical and practical
limits on traditional ideas about persuasive storytelling. Steve Johansen
has written about narrative ethics both in the typical litigation context and
when dealing with clients.67 Jeanne Kaiser has pointed out the ethical and
practical difficulties inherent in advocacy when the events of the case do
not match well with traditional ideas of telling a compelling story.68 In
Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize
Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, Pamela Wilkins explored the
cognitive implications of the typical defense narrative argument against a
sentence of death.69 In Advocacy as an Exercise in Virtue: Lawyering, Bad
Facts, and Furman’s High-Stakes Dilemma,70 I explored a counter-intuitive
narrative strategy when representing an unsympathetic defendant on a
constitutional challenge to the death penalty.71
Scholarship of this type can explore even the use of the stories of non-
parties. For instance, Hearing Voices: Non-Party Stories in Abortion and
Gay Rights Advocacy 72 analyzes the increasing use of stories from a variety
of non-parties to create a broader narrative context on appeal and to
counteract naïve stereotypes about social issues of our day.
Finally, type-three scholarship can explore the uses of narrative to
present the stories of the law itself. Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth,
Metaphor, and Authority73 examines the legal arguments in the briefs
from two canonical constitutional law cases. It argues that the Petitioner’s
Brief in Miranda v. Arizona presents its legal argument implicitly as a
65 Kenneth D. Chestek, Competing Stories: A Case Study of the Role of Narrative Reasoning in Judicial Decisions, 9 LEGAL
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 99 (2012). 
66 J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING 53 (2008).
67 Steven J. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth: The Ethics of Telling Stories to Clients, 38 ARIz. ST. L. J. 961 (2006); Steven
J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 J. ALWD 63
(2010).
68 Jeanne Kaiser, Where Truth and the Story Collide: What Legal Writers Can Learn From the Experience of Non-Fiction
Writers About the Limits of Storytelling, 16 LEGAL WRITING 163 (2010).
69 Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial
Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (2012).
70 Linda H. Edwards, Advocacy as an Exercise in Virtue: Lawyering, Bad Facts, and Furman’s High-Stakes Dilemma, 66
MERCER L. REV. 425 (2015).
71 The article argues that establishing a rhetorical connection with the judge is more important than telling a trite client
story that appears to try to justify horrendous crimes. When the only client story to be told is a story the judge has heard too
many times and will likely reject, the lawyer should avoid appearing to tell that story. See id.
72 Linda H. Edwards, Hearing Voices: Non-Party Stories in Abortion and Gay Rights Advocacy, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1327.
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journey story74 and the Respondent’s Brief in Bowers v. Hardwick presents
its legal argument implicitly as a rescue story.75
*  *  *  *  *
The work of all these scholars, taken together, provides the start of a
conceptual map, and clarifying the map’s terrain can help us understand
and appreciate each other’s work. Once we see that other scholars were
writing about topics with different goals, audiences, and purposes, we may
be less inclined to critique them for failing to write about the topic we
would have chosen. And as the next sections will discuss, a conceptual
map may also help us locate the theoretical home ground of the points we
want to make in our own work. Locating our own work might, therefore,
relieve the perceived need to reach for arguments we cannot sustain.
Finally, a conceptual map may help us notice relationships among topics of
various types, revealing new territory for exploration. All of those
inquiries will deepen the field and expand our understanding of narrative’s
role in law.
II. Epistemological Limits of Definitions
The Law is Made of Stories summarizes some of the definitional
debates about the meaning of the term “story” and then offers new defi-
nitions for “rules,” “story,” “stock story,” and “narrative.”76 Similar debates
have occurred both within legal scholarship77 and in literary studies.78 But
I confess that I am skeptical about how well we can analyze important
issues by redefining terms and then applying those newly defined terms to
the questions of the day. 
First, as a matter of epistemology, definitions are usually constructed
by human beings in order to support or advance their own project. For
instance, I agree with Paskey that Kendall Haven’s definition of “story” is
“narrow and value-laden” because “Haven is not trying to define story
generally” but rather “aims to describe the stories that best suit his
73 Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 885 (2010).
74 Id. at 891–98.
75 Id. at 898–907.
76 Paskey, supra note 3, at 59–71, 76–78.
77 For example, Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson has suggested the term “narrativity” as a move away from old debates about
whether a particular legal text is a story and toward questions of degree, type, and balance of narrative influence. Derek H.
Kiernan-Johnson, A Shift to Narrativity, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 81 (2012). Kiernan-Johnson’s suggestion
strikes me as perceptive and potentially helpful in molding the future of the study of narrative’s role in law.
78 Paskey, supra note 3, at 61–62.
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rhetorical purposes.”79 The problem is unavoidable, however. When we try
to define a term, we do so from our own rhetorical situation. We cannot
help it. Haven did that; I feel sure that I have done that; and Paskey did it
too. It is possible to read The Law is Made of Stories as saying that current
definitions do not support the thesis that stories and rules are the same
thing, and therefore we should choose different definitions in order to
support the thesis we prefer.80
That inescapable subjectivity is part of the reason that definitions
make for unreliable epistemology, and this concern leads to my second.
Paskey says that “[t]he concept of a stock story is too valuable to use
loosely,”81 but I wonder whether the concept is too valuable to use
precisely. In the epigram to this essay, Marilynne Robinson counsels us to
forget definitions and instead to simply “watch.”82 She reminds us that
precise and careful explanations are “too poor and small” to explain
reality.83 I think she may be right. If I fell into this error twenty years ago, I
repent. I hope that today’s readers will construe Convergence as merely a
“finger pointing at the moon.”84
Third, I am skeptical about using definitions to separate content from
form.85 That division seems necessarily artificial because ideas and their
verbal expression are fundamentally indivisible.86 As I read him, Paskey
wants to distinguish “story” (by which he means “events, entities, and situ-
ations”)87 and “discourse” (by which he means “the way the content is
expressed”).88 While that debate has a long history in literary scholarship,
its applicability in law may not be so obvious. What is unclear to me is
79 Id. at 67–68 (emphasis omitted).
80 The Law is Made of Stories makes its case for new defi-
nitions by stating, 
[O]ne cannot effectively claim that something is
(or is not) a story or stock story without a
common understanding of what those words
mean. For purposes of my thesis, the definitions
matter: it is difficult to see the stock story
embedded in a rule if one defines story
narrowly . . . . 
*  *  *  *  *
I take yet another approach, choosing to
identify the essential traits of a legal story by
drawing quite selectively from the work of some
literary theorists.
Paskey, supra note 3, at 62 (emphasis in original).
81 Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). 
82 ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 7. 
83 Id.
84 An ancient Buddhist simile explains that doctrine is like
a finger pointing at the moon; one should take care not to
focus too much on the pointing finger instead of the moon
to which it points.
85 The debate over the extent to which content and form
can be distinguished has a long history, beginning at least as
far back as Plato’s description of “forms” and Aristotle’s
objections. That debate far exceeds not only the scope of
this essay but also my own expertise. I mean only to here
raise a cautionary note.
86 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND
SOLIDARITY 20 (1989) (“[T]he world does not provide us
with any criterion of choice between alternative metaphors,
. . . we can only compare languages or metaphors with one
another, not with something beyond language called ‘fact.’”).
87 Paskey, supra note 3, at 64.
88 Id. at 63. For Paskey, a “story” is defined as “something
that happened to someone,” resulting in “consequences that
are significant.” Id. at 67. “Narrative discourse” refers to “the
manner in which a story is presented, including the medium
(oral or written), the selection of elements, the sequence in
which the elements are presented, the level of detail, and the
language by which the elements are described.” Id.
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where The Law is Made of Stories would place the story’s theme and
narrative perspective. The same “events” can be used to tell very different
“stories,” as every lawyer knows. A storyteller perceives events as making a
particular narrative point. Then the storyteller communicates that
narrative point in part by making choices about such matters as structure,
word selection, omission, and inclusion. If we remember that boundaries
are loose, perhaps we can think of such choices as matters of form. But if
The Law is Made of Stories imagines an unembodied story that exists
outside language or even a story that is a series of events devoid of a
narrative point, I cannot agree. All events are perceived within a language.
In fact, it is language and the resulting narrative point that makes events
into stories. The article may, however, be arguing for a definitional
distinction here in order to set up its later claim that differences in form
should not obscure similarities of content.89 If that is its ultimate point, I
certainly agree.90
These three methodological concerns suggest that we should be
cautious about trying to prove a thesis primarily by creating new defi-
nitions or choosing one existing definition over another simply because
that definition better serves the purpose of our thesis. But of course we
will have to use those very terms in our discussion about the relationship
of stories to rules, so this suggestion cannot resolve anything. It simply
cautions that we should hold our favorite definitions lightly, remaining
open to what we can directly observe.
III. Rules and Stock Stories
The Law is Made of Stories does not seem to be saying that rules are
stories in the sense we normally use the term. By “story,” we normally
mean a series of particular events that happened to particular people in a
particular set of circumstances. Instead, as I read it, the article takes the
position that rules are stock stories. The article distinguishes stock stories
from stories,91 describing stock stories as recurring story templates—
models for how a story might be told.92 In a stock story, key elements are
stated generally. Stock characters are placed in a stock situation and
described in a stock structure.93
89 Id. at 65.
90 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
91 A “stock story is independent of the way story is defined.
The essential point is that the event, entities, and plot are
expressed in general terms . . . .” Paskey, supra note 3, at 70
(emphasis in original). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. A concept missing from the article’s description of
stock stories, however, is that in a stock story, these char-
acters and situations are used to make a stock narrative
point. See infra notes 107–20 and accompanying text. 
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The article’s first thesis, then, is that a legal rule “has the underlying
structure of a stock story.”94 This strikes me as a valuable contribution to
the type-two conversation about narrative. Convergence explored the
common-law process as a narratival activity, where judges use the stories
of prior cases “to create and announce a rule of law.”95 It presented the “if-
then” structure of many rules as “a blatantly narratival form.”96 It observed
that a rule in that structure “describes a set of circumstances and then
pronounces a result: If A, B, and C occur, then Y is the legal conclusion.”97
As an example, Convergence used the elements of a common-law cause of
action for fraud:
1. the defendant made a representation;
2. the representation was false;
3. the defendant knew the representation was false when making it;
4. the defendant intended that the hearer rely on the representation;
5. the hearer did rely;
6. the reliance was justified;
7. damage resulted.98
Convergence observed that “[t]hese elements tell the story of a plaintiff
entitled to relief in a cause of action for fraud. If one could locate the first
successful fraud case articulating these elements, one would probably find
that these elements tell the story of that individual plaintiff.”99 The story of
the original plaintiff becomes the rule. Convergence also accounted for the
process of refining and supplementing common-law rules using the stories
of subsequent cases, since “[r]ules born of narrative seldom arrive fully
formed.”100 It showed that “subsequent stories call into question the
adequacy of the rule crafted from the first story. Each succeeding story
refines the rule further, as new plot twists test or define the existing
rule.”101 What Convergence did not do, and what Paskey has done, is to
recognize that a conjunctive rule102 such as the rule on fraud functions like
a stock story. The rule and a stock story share certain traits, including that
both identify generally expressed elements with a logical relationship to
each other.103
94 Paskey, supra note 3, at 52; see also id. at 71–76. 
95 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 20.
96 Id. at 21.
97 Id.
98 Id. 
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 22.
102 A conjunctive rule is a rule with required elements.
EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND
ORGANIzATION, supra note 52, at 17; EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING AND ANALYSIS, supra note 52, at 80. See also infra
notes 107–10 and accompanying text.
103 Paskey, supra note 3, at 72.
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The Law is Made of Stories then takes what it describes as “a large step
farther,” claiming that “[a] governing rule . . . does not simply provide
evidence of its narrative origin: it is, in fact, still a narrative.”104 The article
supports the claim by observing that governing rules and stock stories can
be expressed in the same structural format. But to say that a rule and a
stock story share a structure is not necessarily to say that a rule is a stock
story. Two things are not the same merely because they use the same
structure, as The Law is Made of Stories correctly points out in distin-
guishing content from form. 105 The article argues that a governing legal
rule is a story because it has the same structure as a stock story.106 One
could just as easily say that a stock story is a rule because it has the same
structure as a rule. 
What’s more, the formal structures of stock stories and conjunctive
rules, while similar, are not the same. Stock stories are models for how to
tell a story about past events. A story told according to that template will
be retrospective. The plaintiff did this; the defendant did that. But rules as
we commonly understand them are prescriptive or proscriptive, using
conditional language. They are not retrospective. Once we convert the
story about fraud into a conjunctive rule, it will take a somewhat different
form, using language like “If elements one through seven happen, then the
defendant will be liable for fraud,” or “A person is prohibited, on pain of
civil liability, from acting in the manner described in elements one
through seven.” 
Another formal difference between stock stories and rules is that of
neutrality. A stock story is a template for relating something that has
happened, describing it in a way that communicates the preferred
normative resolution for those parties. The story is about a particular
person. After hearing that person described according to elements one
through seven, we all know how that person’s story should end: she should
be required to make amends. The key function of the stock story is that it
tells us what to think of that particular person. But a rule takes a neutral
position. It says nothing about a particular person, especially not the
person to whom it will be applied. It simply says that if that person was
like these other people in prior cases, the resolution should be the same.
So my first hesitation about the article’s “large step further” is that while
conjunctive rules and stock stories use similar (though not identical)
104 Id. (emphasis in original). 
105 Id. at 63 (relying on the work of structural theorists to claim that “[t]he first trait may be the most crucial: a useful defi-
nition of story should distinguish between the content of a story and the way the content is expressed. . . . The distinction
between story and discourse is a distinction between content and form . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 
106 Id. at 71.
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structures, that similarity does not answer the relevant question. It does
not necessarily mean either that rules are stock stories (the article’s claim)
or that stock stories are rules (which could equally follow).
Second, stock stories function as commonly accepted cultural scripts.
They are ubiquitous in the culture, like the stock story of the deadbeat dad
or the absent dad who is consumed with his career. These are stock stories
because, culturally, we accept them as story-types and we are likely to see
events from the perspectives of those stock stories. The Law is Made of
Stories seems to agree, citing to the Cinderella story and the Horatio Alger
story as examples of stock stories.107
Some conjunctive rules are indeed made from such stock stories.
Take, for example, the stock story of the greedy caregiver. The stock story,
common in shared cultural knowledge, goes something like this: An
elderly and infirm person hires a live-in caregiver. As the patient becomes
more vulnerable, the caregiver begins to limit the patient’s contact with
the outside world and especially with family members. Soon the caregiver
is in nearly complete control of the patient’s life. She tells the patient
untruths about the patient’s family and portrays herself as the only person
who truly cares about the patient. Soon, she persuades the patient to
change her will, disinheriting the family and bequeathing all of the estate
to the caregiver. For good or for ill, this is a cultural stock story. 
Not surprisingly, this stock story has resulted in a conjunctive
common-law rule108 called “undue influence,” which, if proven, can allow
recovery of the estate for the wronged family members. The common-law
conjunctive rule usually goes something like this: 
A person exercised undue influence if 
1. the testator was susceptible to undue influence,
2. the person had the opportunity to exercise undue influence,
3. the person had the motive to influence the testator to exercise
undue influence, and
4. the testator’s disposition was the result of the influence.109
Other conjunctive rules, however, are not based on stock stories.
Consider, for example, this conjunctive rule setting out the elements
107 Id. at 70. 
108 Much of the discussion here and elsewhere centers on common-law rules because in the common-law process, the
construction of a rule from a story is often more clear, but statutes can be constructed from stories as well. For example,
consider the category of statutes known as “Megan’s laws,” which require notification when a convicted sexual offender
moves into a neighborhood. Those statutes were enacted largely as a result of the national outcry over the tragic death of
Megan Kanka. 
109 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS, sec. 8.3, cmt. f (2003).
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necessary to prove mental capacity to make a will. A testator must be
capable of
1. knowing the nature and extent of her property,
2. knowing the natural objects of her bounty,
3. knowing the disposition she is making of her property, and 
4. relating these elements to each other to form an orderly desire for
the property’s disposition.110
Most of us would consider this four-element test a rule. Yet at least as
far as I can see, this rule is not built from a culturally shared stock story. It
may well be built from the stories in prior cases, but I cannot discern the
roots of a story-type we all know—one that we soak up as part of our
cultural common knowledge.
So far we have been talking only about conjunctive rules—rules that
list required elements. The Law is Made of Stories uses the burglary rule
and the negligence rule as examples of rules commonly articulated with a
conjunctive (if-then) structure.111 But conjunctive rules provide the easy
examples. As support for the thesis that rules are actually stories,
aggregative rules and balancing rules are much more troublesome. 
Aggregative rules establish a legal standard and often include a non-
exclusive list of factors.112 The Law is Made of Stories gives us an example
of an aggregative rule113 that identifies the best interests of the child as the
standard in a custody proceeding.114 The statute provides a nonexclusive
list of factors for assessing the child’s best interests, including (a) the
child’s health, safety and welfare; (b) any history of abuse; (c) the nature
and amount of parental contact; and (d) drug or alcohol abuse.115 The
article argues that we can see a stock story in the statute by rephrasing its
language as “. . . a court may grant custody to either parent, or to both
parents jointly, if it would be in the child’s best interests to do so.”116 The
article claims that this statement is a stock story because there are four
characters (a child, two parents, and the judge); an event (presumably the
court proceeding); and a plot (meaning that significant consequences will
arise from the court’s decision).117 In other words, two parents are before
the court, each asking for custody of the child. 
110 See id., sec. 8.1.
111 Paskey, supra note 3, at 72–74.
112 EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND
ORGANIzATION, supra note 52, at 17–19; EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING AND ANALYSIS, supra note 52, at 80–82. If two
flexible standards are juxtaposed in contrast to each other,
the rule is a balancing rule. An example is the discovery rule
that balances the burden of production of documents
against the likely benefit. Id.; see infra note 122 and accom-
panying text.
113 The article does not use the term, however.
114 Paskey, supra note 3, at 74–75 (reviewing Cal. Fam.
Code § 3020(a) (West 2014)).
115 Cal. Fam. Code § 3011 (West 2016)
116 Paskey, supra note 3, at 75.
117 Id. 
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But the statute cannot be considered a story simply because it applies
to parties in a judicial proceeding. It does not describe any possible plot, as
does the fraud rule. It is certainly fair to say that “the rule demands a
story.”118 Each of the parties no doubt will craft and present a story from
past characters, events, and circumstances. Those competing stories
might even be built from stock stories so as to be more convincing. The
mother might construct a story based on the stock story of an absent
father, consumed with work and perhaps his extramarital affairs. The
father might construct a story based on the stock story of a stay-at-home
mother who has become addicted to prescriptions drugs. Each of these
stories would be using a culturally shared stock story in order to be more
persuasive (a type-three observation). But the rule itself simply identifies
the legal standard and invites the parties to tell the story of their choice.
Stating the relevant legal standard as the child’s best interest119 does not
include a plot with a narrative arc, as do the Cinderella story and the
Horatio Alger story.120
Perhaps it would be helpful here to suggest a concept about the study
of rules. The Law is Made of Stories correctly realizes that rules come in
different varieties and that these differences might matter. But to cate-
gorize rules, the article selects a two-part taxonomy that does not tell us
much about how stories and rules relate: Hart’s distinction between
“primary rules of obligation” (legal commands governing human conduct)
and “secondary rules of recognition” (legal commands about how rules of
obligation are adopted, interpreted, and enforced).121 I would suggest that
the article is right to suspect that differences among rule-types might
matter to its topic, but the legal academy’s long-standing distinction
between “rules” and “standards” might be a more useful vehicle for
exploring the implications of different kinds of rules. 
Legal scholars have long explored the distinctions between legal
commands described as “rules” and those described as “standards.” The
primary distinction depends on the extent to which the legal command
provides explanatory content before the parties act. For instance, in Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,122 Louis Kaplow offers an
example of a “rule”: the legal command that drivers must not exceed 55
miles per hour on a particular highway. A “standard,” on the other hand,
would be the alternative legal command that drivers must not drive at an
118 Id.; See also Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 28–32. 
119 Paskey, supra note 3, at 75.
120 Id. at 70.
121 Id. at 59–60.
122 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557, 559–60 (1992).
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excessive speed. The former legal command (the “rule”) determines what
an excessive speed would be and does so before the driver takes the wheel.
It selects a speed without reference to particular circumstances, such as
weather, road conditions, the type of vehicle, or the driver’s skill and expe-
rience. The latter legal command (the “standard”) does not select a
particular speed in advance. Rather, it establishes a more flexible
“standard” that postpones the decision about whether a driver was
speeding, in part in order to leave room for these other more contextual
considerations.123 For our purposes, we might say that the “rule” implicitly
incorporates typical story-facts in which a speed greater than 55 would be
excessive. A “standard,” on the other hand, invites a variety of stories about
what might be an excessive speed. 
When legal writing professors speak of rules, we generally do not
mean to distinguish between “rules” and “standards” in this sense. Thus,
The Law is Made of Stories uses the term “rule” to include both “rules” and
“standards” as they are distinguished elsewhere in the academy. But
perhaps it would be useful for us to consider this fundamental distinction
and the implications it might raise for the question of whether rules are
stories. It may also be helpful to note that the term “rule” as used outside
legal writing scholarship roughly correlates to the term “conjunctive rule”
and that the term “standard” roughly correlates to the terms “aggregative
rules” and “balancing rules” as used here. 
Where does all this talk about rules leave us? While a rule (whether
conjunctive, aggregative, or balancing) is not itself a story, a rule does
identify the narrative point the parties should try to make with the stories
they will construct—the moral of their stories, as it were.124 If, in our
custody dispute, the mother constructs and presents a story based on the
template of an absent father consumed with work, the moral of her story
will be that awarding custody to such a father would not be in the child’s
best interests. If the father constructs and presents the story of a stay-at-
home mother addicted to prescription drugs, the moral of his story will be
that a custody award to the mother would not be in the child’s best
interests. These stories will be distinctly different stock stories, however.
Thus, we might say that the rule suggests the moral of a story but leaves to
each party the choice of what kind of story—including possibly what kind
of stock story—to tell. 
123 Id. 
124 See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113–14 (2000) (A plot usually concludes
“by drawing the then-and-there of the tale . . . into the here-and-now . . . through some coda—say, for example, Aesop’s char-
acteristic moral of the story.”) (emphasis in original). 
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IV. Speaking of Narrative Reasoning
In its final substantive section,125 The Law is Made of Stories argues its
second thesis: that narrative reasoning must be redefined because “the
analytical moves we think of as rule-based reasoning are often a form of
narrative reasoning, in which the story in a given set of facts is compared
to the stock story embedded in the rule.”126 The section critiques prior
authors as taking the position that narrative reasoning is a discrete strand
of analysis separate from reasoning based on traditional modes such as
rules, analogies, and policies. It maintains that the prevailing view, which
presumably includes the view expressed in Convergence, “would place
rule-based reasoning entirely within the paradigmatic [dialectic] mode,
and narrative reasoning entirely within the narrative [analogic] mode,
thereby drawing a sharp line between the two forms of reasoning.”127
If that is what Convergence seems to say, then I did not write the
article clearly enough. The goal in Convergence was to show the work of
narrative in all forms of reasoning judges routinely use. Every single
express justification for a court’s creation and application of a legal rule (a
type-two question) has narrative roots. These justifications are not them-
selves stories, but they are—all of them—made of stories. Thus, as a
matter of type-two analysis, narrative is omnipresent within the para-
digmatic mode, and we do not need to redefine the term “narrative
reasoning” in order to make that point. Further, as a matter of type-one
analysis, scholars have long shown that narrative and other precon-
structions form the starting point of all paradigmatic thought.128
When I used the term “narrative reasoning” in Convergence,129 I was
uncertain about the choice, primarily because since the Enlightenment,
“reasoning” has commonly been used to refer only to systematized, ration-
alized, formal and semiformal thought such as reliance on rules, analogies,
and policies.130 Since the Enlightenment, any meaning we discern by
narrative has been expressly excluded from the traditional idea of
“reasoning.” The Enlightenment meaning of “reasoning” refers only to
those conclusions for which we can state seemingly neutral reasons, in
125 Paskey, supra note 3, at 76–78.
126 Id. at 52.
127 Id. at 76.
128 See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text.
129 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 9–10; Paskey, supra note 3, at 56.
130 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 8–9 (explaining David Tracy’s concept of “dialectic” imagination); see also id. at
9 n.6 (“The term ‘reasoning’ is used broadly in this article to encompass its pre-enlightenment meaning. The older concept of
‘reason’ employed here embraces the full scope of human capacity for discerning truth and meaning, including the analytical,
dialectical, analogical and mythopoeic.”).
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other words, reasons we have generalized into commonly applicable prin-
ciples.131 In law, such reasons most often are rules, analogies, and policies.
Because I believed that most or perhaps all human understanding orig-
inates in the poetic mode and is only later translated into rules and
policies, I thought perhaps we could use the term “narrative reasoning” as
a small act of civil disobedience against the hegemony of dialectical
thought.132
To explore the idea further, Convergence discussed narrative
reasoning alongside other forms of reasoning traditionally used in legal
discourse. As I hope is clear, Convergence is a type-two discussion of the
express ways judges justify their decisions. It is not a discussion about
narrative as a preconstruction, which would be a type-one exploration of
the ways in which narrative and other frames are the cognitive and
jurisprudential starting points for all other forms of reasoning.133 Nor is it
a type-three discussion of narrative as a tool of persuasion.134 Rather, its
goal was to explore narrative’s multiple roles in the way judges articulate
their reasons for creating, amending, or applying a legal rule. To be true to
its topic, Convergence identified forms of reasoning by examining the
forms expressly used in judicial opinions. It demonstrated that on
occasion, judges “reason” directly from a narrative without the intervening
step of creating a neutrally stated legal rule.135 But more commonly, judges
justify their choice of a legal rule by discussions of authority, policy, and
the facts of the case before them. Convergence identified the implicit roots
of narrative in all of these other forms of express legal reasoning.136
Like other works before and since, Convergence aimed to shed light on
the relationship, sometimes implicit, sometimes not, between narrative
and rules. This is a subtle topic, which may be explored from various
perspectives. To make its case that “narrative reasoning” should be
redefined, The Law is Made of Stories cites the work of Jerome Bruner as
authority for what the article calls the “perceived dichotomy between rule-
based reasoning and narrative reasoning.”137 Bruner is presented as seeing
131 “[P]rinciples should be general. That is, it must be possible to formulate them without the use of what would be intu-
itively recognized as proper names, or rigged definite descriptions.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 131 (1971).
132 “[I]t has long been a part of the Western philosophical tradition to prefer the abstract and the universal over the
particular and the contextual.” Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 682
(1994) (reprinted with permission, 6 J. ALWD 88, 89 (Fall 2009). 
133 I took my turn at that type-one topic in Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand?, supra note 33.
134 My type-three offerings have been EDWARDS, READINGS IN PERSUASION, supra note 54; Edwards, Advocacy as an
Exercise in Virtue, supra note 70; Edwards, Hearing Voices, supra note 72; and Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law, supra
note 73. 
135 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 17–23.
136 Id. at 23–28.
137 Paskey, supra note 3, at 76.
SPEAKING OF STORIES AND LAW 177
the paradigmatic and narrative modes as complementary, but cautioning
that “[e]fforts to reduce one mode to the other or to ignore one at the
expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich diversity of
thought.”138
I am not sure whether The Law is Made of Stories intends to dismiss
Bruner’s work as wrong or whether it takes the position that we have
misapplied Bruner to legal discourse. If the former, Bruner is a daunting
target to choose. His book Actual Minds, Possible Worlds is generally
recognized as one of the most influential works of the twentieth century.
Even more daunting, dismissing Bruner may also require dismissal of such
giants of legal theory as Bruce Ackerman, Derrick Bell, Ronald Dworkin,
Charles Fried, Bernard Jackson, John Rawls, Herbert Wechsler, and
Patricia Williams, and perhaps even philosophers such as Descartes, Kant,
Nietzsche, and Plato.139 I am no expert in philosophy—legal or otherwise.
I know only enough to suggest that we should not lightly reject the work of
so many foundational thinkers of western civilization, especially not
without authority and a compelling set of rationales. On the other hand, if
the article aims to say that Bruner is right but we have misapplied him to
law, that case would need to be made expressly as well. Without more, it is
difficult to see why Bruner’s warning against reducing one mode to the
other (for instance by claiming that rules are stories) could apply to other
contexts but not to law. 
What might be going on here? Perhaps The Law is Made of Stories
arises from the accurate intuition that legal reasoning is rooted in
narrative and other preconstructions—that ultimately nearly everything
begins as narrative. That is a type-one point that has been and continues
to be explored from jurisprudential, rhetorical, and cognitive perspectives.
We can support that claim from ample literature on narrative as precon-
struction. The article also notes that conjunctive rules and stock stories
can function in similar ways, that is, as templates for the kinds of situ-
ations in which the law will intervene. That is a type-two point, and it is a
useful addition to our understanding of how we talk about law. Finally, the
article argues that rules are stories in part because rules call for stories. It
asserts that stories are the most important form of persuasion available to
the parties and that lawyers cannot practice law without telling stories
(type-three points). While these observations are true, they do not suggest
that rules are stories. Using them to argue that point conflates the type-
two question of how we construct rules with type-one questions of
138 Id. (quoting JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 11 (1986)).
139 See generally Sherwin, supra note 132, at 89–94.
178 LEGAL COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: JALWD / VOLUME 13 / 2016
primacy and type-three questions of persuasion. If we clarify narrative’s
different kinds of influence, we can prove narrative’s foundational role in
rule-based reasoning by using the literature of all three types rather than
by claiming that rules are stories. 
V. Conclusion
We have barely begun to explore the ways in which narrative may
relate to law, but it is already clear that the relationships are multiple and
complex.140 Narrative functions as a preconstruction, probably the most
ubiquitous and important of them all. In that role, it provides the frame
through which we see all legal issues and within which all our discourse
occurs. Narrative is also a powerful tool for many lawyering tasks; it may
be the most powerful tool of persuasion a lawyer can use. 
Narrative also plays key roles in the express justifications judges use to
explain their construction and application of rules. We can think of these
roles in multiple ways. On the question of narrative’s relationship to
merely one of those express justifications—rule-based reasoning—I
suspect that, ultimately, we will see that neither extreme is correct. Rule-
based reasoning is not the opposite of narrative, nor is it the same as
narrative. Rather, it is a mode of reasoning constructed from multiple
narrative raw materials. The exploration of these narrative raw materials
will, I hope, continue to engage us for years to come.
I want to close with a note of gratitude for The Law is Made of Stories.
While I have here offered a concurring opinion on some of its points, I
remain grateful for its insights and for its contribution to the field. The
article provides compelling support for the foundational idea that rules are
made of stories, and it invites us to look more deeply than we have yet
done at the convergences of narrative and law. When we do, we may
conclude that stories and rules are each incomplete standing alone. Rules
grow from and return to the soil of narrative, but narrative needs the
stability, rationality, and predictability of rules.141 The more we understand
this symbiotic relationship, the better we will understand both the legal
system and the important work of lawyers within it. 
140 Edwards, Convergence, supra note 14, at 7 (referring to “the complex and sometimes subtle relationship” between
narrative and law).
141 Id. at 50.
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